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The National Assembly in Korea recently passed a law envisioned
to promote venture capital companies in Korea. Putting the substance
of the promotional measures aside, the government apparently intended the enactment to emulate the success of the venture capital
market in the United States and several other countries. In this Essay,
we will demonstrate that while the development of the venture capital market in the United States resulted from an evolutionary process,
which led to a specific contract regime geared to accommodate different players with varying incentives and sets of information, the
Korean government is playing a more active role in its venture capital market by providing tax-subsidy incentives for eligible companies. We argue that the enactment of a law promoting venture capital
alone is not enough to emulate the successes achieved in other countries. Instead, it is imperative for the Korean government to understand the complex and multifaceted relationship between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists and to have a well-functioning
screening and monitoring system in place. Eventually, incentive
structures, labor practices, and other institutional framework may
need to change in order to promote the market for innovation in Korea. In this endeavor, the government's role should be limited to providing an infrastructure, rather than participating as an active player
in the market.

INTRODUCTION
On July 30, 1997, the National Assembly in Korea passed the
"Special Law to Promote Venture Capital Companies" ("SLPVCC"),
which became effective for a ten-year period starting October 10,
1997.' The primary purpose of the law is to provide a more efficient
and effective market environment for venture capital companies in
Korea through direct and indirect subsidies, exemptions, and the relaxation of existing regulations. This enactment, is an effort to replicate the success of the venture capital market in the United States

1. See Special Law to Promote Venture Capital Companies, Law No. 5381
(Aug. 28, 1997) [hereinafter SLPVCC].
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and several other countries.'
In general, distinct features of venture capital investment include
high-risk and high-return.3 In the United States, the high-risk feature
is accommodated by a special form of venture capital contract that
aligns the various incentives of contracting parties, while simultaneously ensuring proper monitoring. The high-return feature involves a
well-developed American equity market, which functions as a major
venue for reaping high returns for investors willing to bear high
risks.
In Korea, however, the government plays an active role in the
venture capital market.4 First, instead of providing a functional and
flexible definition of venture capital, the SLPVCC specifically sets
forth requirements for venture capital companies." Second, by employing various preferential treatments and other measures, the
SLPVCC heavily protects entrepreneurs from downside risks. In addition, the lack of a properly functioning equity market for venture
capital hinders the realization of upside potential for investors.
Therefore, contrary to the stated purpose of deregulation, the underlying market mechanism is skewed to the extent that the nature of
venture capital can no longer be characterized as a high-risk and
high-return investment. Rather, venture capital in Korea has become
identified with limited-risk and limited-return investment.
2. See Jin Hyung Kim, Explanation on Special Law to Promote Venture
CapitalCompanies, VENTURE CAPITAL, Fall 1997, at 2.

3. See id. at 3. Scholars have described venture capital as follows:
We define "venture capital," consistent with American understanding, as investment by specialized venture capital organizations (which we call "venture
capital funds") in high-growth, high-risk, often high-technology firms that
need capital to finance product development or growth and must, by the nature of their business, obtain this capital largely in the form of equity rather
than debt.
Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capitaland the Strcture of Capttal
Markets: Banks versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 245 (1998).

4. See infra Part IV (noting that while the government emphasizes the role of
the market mechanism and stresses the significance of deregulation, the role of the
government remains substantial).
5. In order to accommodate different forms of venture capital, the SLPVCC
law attempts to provide several categories of venture capital. See SLPVCC, supra
note 1, art. 2. Nonetheless, it is still true that the law descriptively defines venture
capital.
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The literature on evolutionary economic theory suggests that there
may not be a single optimal path to equilibrium, but rather chance
events may lead to different paths and disturb equilibrium.6 In the
venture capital context, economic theory indicates that the particular
form of venture capital contracting prevalent in the United States
may not necessarily be a universal form of contracting applicable
throughout the world. Indeed, the character of venture capital contracting in an economy with a corporate governance system centered
on the stock market, such as in the United States, is much different
from that of bank-centered systems such as Germany and Japan.7
Nevertheless, a review of venture capital contracting in the United
States provides insights for a general understanding of venture capital contracting as distinguished from other forms of financial contracting.
Part I of this Essay explains and describes the nature of venture
capital in the United States, particularly its contracting process, economic structure, and financial success. Next, Part II briefly explores
the venture capital industry in Korea and assesses two recently enacted laws regulating venture capital endeavors. Part III compares
and contrasts the purposes and consequences of Korean venture
capital laws of Korea with those of the United States. Finally, Part IV
assesses Korea's attempt to emulate the United States' venture capital system and recommends initiatives for improving the venture
capital system in Korea. This Essay concludes that for a successful
Korean venture capital system, the government must refrain from
interfering with fundamental market mechanisms and create the necessary institutional infrastructure that promotes incentives for yen6. Nelson and Winter are among the first authors attempting to theorize this
literature. See Richard R. Nelson, Recent Evolutionary Theorizing About Economic
Change, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 48 (1995) (discussing Alfred Marshall's book,
Principles of Economics). See generally RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G.
WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982) (developing
an evolutionary theory of the capabilities and behavior of firms in the market environment).
7. See generally Black & Gilson, supra note 3 (noting that German and Japanese banks are fewer in number but larger in relative size). See also Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Marketfor Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital
and the Comparative CorporateGovernance Debate, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 865, 87479 (1997) (examining the institutional environment for venture capital in the
United States and Japan).
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ture capitalists, entrepreneurs, and investors to engage in highrisk/high-return endeavors.

I. VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTING IN THE
UNITED STATES AND ITS ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE
In the United States, venture capital has developed in response to
the market demand for high-risk/high-return investments. In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, wealthy families such as the
Vanderbilts, Whitneys, Morgans, and Rockefellers often funded
high-risk/high-return investments. 8 With an increase in demand for
high-risk and high-return investments and a change in the 1979
amendment to the "prudent man" rule provided in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"),9 many small investors began to infuse substantial amounts of money into venture
capital through their pension funds.'0 Prior to the 1979 ERISA
amendment, pension funds were investing substantial amounts of
money into venture capital." Accompanying this revision in the law,
a change in the sources of venture capital funding arrived. While
only 15% ($218 million) of American venture capital funds were
composed of pension funds in 1978, the figure increased to 46% ($3

8. See Paul A. Gompers, The Rise and Fall of Venture Capital, 23 Bus. &
ECON. HIST. 1, 5 (1994) (noting that these private funds are also known as Angel
Capital). Angels continue to play a role in modem day venture capital investments,
although their role is not clearly understood. See George W. Fenn et al., The Role
of Angel Investors and Venture Capitalists in Financing High-Tech Start-Ups 12
(1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).

9. See G. FENN ET AL.,

THE ECONOMICS OF THE PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET 10

(1995). Prior to 1979, the Department of Labor required that pension fund investments be based on the judgment of a "prudent man," which had been widely interpreted as prohibiting pension fund investments in securities issued by venture
capital funds. After the 1979 amendment, however, such investments were permitted, provided that they do not harm an entire portfolio.
10. See Gompers, supra note 8, at 12.
11. See id. at 13 (finding that by the end of the 1980s, pension funds held approximately three trillion dollars).
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trillion) by 1988.12 Presently, institutional investors are the principal
source of funding for venture capitalists. These institutional investors
dominate the United States venture capital industry, representing
over 75% of the total capital raised in 1995.'" Therefore, flexible interpretation of ERISA's "prudent man" rule greatly contributes to
funding the venture capital industry in the United States.
The development of a special form of financial contract, which
bolstered the financing of venture capital companies, complemented
the availability of funds. In particular, the economic structure of
venture capital contracting in the United States is based on both the
alignment of economic incentives and a monitoring mechanism. The
venture capital industry has three principal players: entrepreneurs,
venture capitalists, and risk-loving investors. 14 Venture capitalists
pool funds from risk-loving investors and invest in projects carried
out by entrepreneurs, who are chosen by venture capitalists. Those
invested companies then become a part of investment portfolios
managed by venture capitalists.' 5
While venture capital funds are formed as limited partnerships, the
relationship between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists is dictated
by a unique set of financial contracts, which align economic incentives and implement monitoring. In a venture capital limited partnership, outside investors become passive limited partners, while venture capitalists emerge as general partners. Limited partners function
as a prime source of financing in the hope of receiving a high return
for their investments. The general partners actually control and manage the portfolio companies. A venture capital fund, however, is
typically composed of blind pools. 6 Thus, while the limited partners
12. See id.
13. See Black & Gilson, supra note 3, at 249 (discussing venture capital investors).
14. By "isk-loving," we do not mean risk-lovers (as opposed to risk-averse investors) as described in conventional economics textbooks. We simply mean investors who are willing to bear high risks in return for high expected returns.
15. Invested companies are also known as venture capital companies, or more
frequently, portfolio companies.
16. Under the blind pooling, the limited partners are not allowed to allocate
their contributed funds to any particular projects. Rather, their funds must be invested according to the decision of the general partners. The proceeds from such
investments are distributed in proportion to the contributions made by individual
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know the fund's general investment strategy, they are not privy to information regarding the particular companies in which that fund invests. In addition, limited partners are not allowed to participate in
the day-to-day management of the fund's business; only general
partners control the management of the fund.
Due to the existence of information asymmetry between venture
capitalists and entrepreneurs regarding the prospects of proposed
projects, venture capitalists are at a disadvantage when gauging the
probability of success of the entrepreneurs' project proposals. Concurrently, entrepreneurs are uneasy in revealing too much information to venture capitalists before an actual contract is signed. Accordingly, drafting specific financial contracts assists in satisfying
the economic needs of both contracting parties." For example, venture capital contracts allow venture capitalists to retain complete
control over venture capital companies, even to the extent that venture capitalists may terminate entrepreneurs at will. Consequently,
venture capitalists maintain sufficient flexibility to either dissolve or
restructure venture capital companies to reduce their losses in case of
failure. On the other hand, entrepreneurs normally are in great need
of financing and accordingly are willing to relinquish control in exchange for initial funding.
In practice, general partners, who manage venture capital funds,
usually invest only 1% of the capital and receive total control of the
company management.' 8 It is important to note, however, that general
partners' principal contribution is their expertise, not capital. General
partners' contribution also includes management, consulting assistance, intensive monitoring of the investing companies' performance,
and the use of the funds' reputation to give the investing companies
credibility with potential customers, suppliers, and employees.'" The
compensation scheme for general partners is usually written to relimited partners. Thus, for the limited partners, the overall performance of the
funds is crucial, rather than the success or failure of individual portfolio companies.
17. See generally William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance o]
Venture-CapitalOrganizations,27 J. FIN. ECON. 473 (1990) (providing a detailed
description of the economic structure of venture capital contracts).
18. The remainder of the funding comes from limited partners.
19. See Black & Gilson, supra note 3, at 252-55 (explaining the importance of
exit by the venture capital fund).
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flect their performance. General partners receive only a modest
amount of the management fee for their service-usually 2.5% of the
committed capital. The primary source of general partners' compensation arrives in the form of the right to claim a specified percentage
of profits realized-20% is a common figure.20
If such ventures are successful, venture capitalists return the companies' control to the entrepreneurs in exchange for a handsome
amount of investment returns." Of course, not all venture capital
projects are successful. In fact, in the United States, only one-third of
venture capital companies are successful. Nonetheless, during the
last several decades, the annual average returns from investments
were extremely lucrative at over 40%, compared to 12% for stocks
and 5% for long-term bonds.22
The possibility of receiving an extraordinary return for their efforts provides entrepreneurs a great incentive to focus and work very
hard on novel ideas. In addition, the high-risk and high-return nature
of this type of investment encourages venture capitalists to commit
extra efforts into monitoring entrepreneurs. 3 First, during the early
stages of a venture capital project, venture capitalists frequently visit
each portfolio company to assess and monitor progress. Second, instead of disbursing financial resources all at once, venture capital
contracts provide stage financing, where venture capitalists take several chronological steps in financing entrepreneurs. For instance, in
the beginning, venture capitalists may provide just enough funds for
entrepreneurs to build a prototype. The venture capitalists may reassess the probability of the project's success after evaluating such a
prototype. At the end of each stage, terms of later rounds of invest20. See Sahlman, supra note 17, at 491 (noting that venture capital companies
usually receive compensation from two sources for managing the investments in
each limited partnership).
21. See generally Paul A. Gompers, An Examination of Convertible Securities
in Venture Capital Investments (Harvard Business School Working Paper, 1997)
(finding that venture capital finds' equity investments in portfolio companies typically take the form of convertible preferred stock).
22. See Zvi BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 126-27 (1993) (providing statistics for
the average annual returns on venture capital investments).
23. See generally Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the
Stage of Venture Capital,50 J. FIN. & ECON. 1461 (1995) (examining the various
factors affecting the structure of periodic investment by venture capitalists).
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ments are negotiated. Bargaining power is tilted in favor of venture
capitalists since they normally reserve the option to discontinue
funding at the end of each stage. Thus, venture capitalists also gather
information needed to monitor the progress of the venture.'
Monitoring efforts by venture capitalists are reinforced by the disproportionate allocation of the right to control the management of
their portfolio companies. It is not unusual for venture capitalists to
reserve the right to name a majority of a portfolio company's directors, even when their shares represent less than a majority of the
company's total equity shares.2 ' Further, the venture capitalists and
the portfolio company enter into a series of contractual negative
covenants, requiring prior approval by the venture capitalists before
making major business decisions. This control mechanism complements the staged financing structure. In effect, it delegates to venture
capitalists the right to determine whether to continue the portfolio
company's projects.
Venture capital investments normally focus on early-stage financing and usually have a limited duration of ten years.2' Due in
part to the limited duration, general partners have a strong incentive
to liquidate their investments into a portfolio as quickly as possible.
Given that general partners seek to raise capital for a new fund by the
midpoint of the existing fund's life, and because the overall performance of the prior funds functions as an important factor in the partners' ability to raise new capital, it is extremely important to achieve
an early and successful exit. Two principal exit methods are taking
the portfolio company public through an initial public offering on a
stock market or selling the entity to another company. 2' The limited

24. See id. at 1470 (providing studies of venture capitalist monitoring processes). In 1991, based on 794 randomly selected venture capital companies, Gompers found 109 rounds of stage financing for venture capital investments of S142
million. Id. Venture capital funds invest one-third of their capital in new investments and save two-thirds for use in later round financing of companies already in
their investment portfolio. See Sahlman, supra note 17, at 475.
25. See Gompers, supra note 21, at 24-25 (noting that investors in venture
capital have little voting control).
26. See generally Gompers, supra note 23 (discussing the duration and size of
venture capital investments).
27. See Black & Gilson, supra note 3, at 255-57 (explaining the exit and reinvestment cycle for venture capital funds and capital providers).
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duration of a venture capital fund indicates that the fund's financial
and non-financial contributions are especially valuable to early stage
companies. In particular, as the portfolio company gains its own experience, the value of non-financial contributions normally declines.
By the time the success or failure of the portfolio company can be
assessed, the expertise and financial resources could be used more
profitably in a new round of early stage companies. Thus, the fund
would exit.28
Finally, because venture capital companies normally do not generate any revenues in their initial stage of existence, companies must
be financed by equity. The negative cash flows in the early stages de
facto prevent entrepreneurs from obtaining debt financing, which requires steady interest payments. Accordingly, convertible preferred
stocks play a crucial role in venture capital. 9 Stocks provide entrepreneurs with the necessary equity financing, while also furnishing
venture capitalists with senior claims to the remaining assets of the
venture capital companies in case of failure.3
On the basis of the aforementioned discussion, it is clear that the
United States' venture capital system is a functional one, based on a
particular form of financial contracting that aligns diverse economic
incentives and provides an effective monitoring system for high-risk
investments with potentially high returns. Furthermore, it should be
emphasized that the basic structure of American venture capital contracting is dictated by market ordering, not by government mandates.
The form of venture capital contracting that the United States follows
is a result of the evolution of different players responding to various
signals and incentives in the market. In sum, the United States' government has never played an active role in the formation of the venture capital industry; rather it allows participating parties to mold a
venture capital system for themselves.

28. See id. at 254 (noting the existence of economies of scope in venture capital).
29. See Gompers. supra note 21, at 5 (stating that debt financing reduces the
uncertainty of determining the fair price for financial securities).
30. See generally Erik Berglof, A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance,
10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 247 (1994) (discussing how an entrepreneur and an external
investor allocate revenues and control in a venture capital relationship).
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II. BRIEF HISTORY OF VENTURE CAPITAL IN
KOREA
During the past several decades, Korea has realized rapid economic growth hardly matched by other economies. Between the
1960s, when industrialization first began, and the mid-1990s, Korea's per capita annual income grew from $ 100 to over $10,000 and
its export income from less than $100 million to over $100 billion."
In 1996, as the world's eleventh largest economy, Korea joined the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD"), an organization largely composed of developed countries. Nevertheless, in 1997, Korea underwent the most serious economic crisis in its modem history. While opinions differ among
commentators, they generally agree that the export-oriented policy,
backed by strong government intervention, played a crucial role in
the crisis.32

Although the availability of cheap but highly qualified labor forces
significantly contributed at an initial stage, as the economy grew and
matured, the cost of employment increased and Korea began to lose
its comparative advantage in labor-intensive goods." As a country
lacking in natural resources, Korea decided to exploit its relatively
abundant, highly educated and motivated work force while borrowing necessary capital from international lenders. Venture capital
naturally became a focal point of discussion as the government began
to promote knowledge-intensive and high value-added industries.
In fact, although institutional support for the operation of venture
capital is a relatively recent development in Korea, a prototype of
venture capital existed in the early 1970s. In addition, several venture

31. See BYuNG-NAK SONG, THE RISE OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY 57 (1990)
(describing the process of economic development in Korea).
32. See Young Back Choi, A Perspective on Korean Economic Development,
4-13 (Paper presented at the Jan. 1999 annual meeting of the American Economic
Association), available in <http://econ.tamu.edu/kaeaIPROCEEDING/proceed99.
htm> (discussing the conflicting views regarding Korean development and the
economic crisis of 1997).
33. See Business Korea, December 1995/January 1996, at 13-15 (source in Korean).
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capital companies were incorporated in the 1980s. 34 Not until 1986,
however, did Korea provide the institutional infrastructure for the
venture capital industry. In 1986 Korea enacted several laws related
to venture capital, including the Law to Promote Small and Medium
Size Companies35 and the Law to Assist the Financing of New Technology Ventures.36 After these laws were enacted, the industry grew
rather quickly. In approximately a ten-year period beginning in the
mid-1980s, the number of venture capital companies grew from
twelve to forty-nine by 1995. 37 These companies invested in 1,891
projects during the years 1987 and 1997, for a total of 1.5 trillion
won. 38
The administration by different government agencies over venture
capital companies have produced varying results, dependent upon
venture capital operating environments. For example, the Ministry of
Finance and Economy administers the Law to Assist the Financing of
New Technology Ventures; the Ministry of Science and Technology
regulates the operation of the Korea Technology Banking ("KTB");' 9

34. For example, Korea Technology Advancement Corporation ("KTAC") was
incorporated in 1974 to commercialize research results from Korea Institute of
Science and Technology ("KIST"). Venture capital companies established in the
1980s include Korea Technology Development Corporation ("KTDC"), Korean
Development and Investment Corporation ("KDIC"), and Korea Technology Finance Corporation ("KTFC"). A distinctive feature of these companies is that public funds were, at least partially, used in establishing these companies. In the case
of KDIC, even international development institutions, including the International
Finance Corporation ("IFC") and the Asian Development Bank ("ADB") contributed to its financing.
35. See Law to Promote Small and Medium Size Companies, Law No. 3831
(May 12, 1986) (source in Korean).
36. See Law to Assist the Financing of New Technology Ventures, Law No.
4068 (Dec. 31, 1988) (source in Korean).
37. See DUK-HOON LEE ET AL., DEVELOPMENT PLAN ON FINANCIAL ASSISTANT
TO START-UP COMPANIES 42 (1996) (finding by 1995, that 25 venture-backed
companies were listed in the stock market) (source in Korean)
38. See Business: Wild Careers,ECONOMIST, Feb. 14, 1998, at 67 (discussing
Korea's high-tech firms).
39. See S. Korea sells 10.2 pct stake in Korea Technology Bankingfor 9.3 bin
won, (AFX News, Jan. 21, 1999) available in WL 10491859 (reporting that the
government recently sold its stake in the company as a part of its reform program,
making it a private company). The KTB is a venture capital company established
under a special law.
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and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy administers the
Law to Promote Small and Medium Size Companies-most of the
private venture capital companies are registered under this latter
law. 40 Each venture capital company is incorporated under one of
these laws. Thus venture capital operations are subject to different
regulations that lead to different investment activities.
Preliminary conditions are required to register under the Law to
Assist the Financing of New Technology Ventures. For example,
venture capital companies must be in operation for a minimum of
two years to register under this law-a difficult condition to satisfy.'
In return, qualifying companies are allowed to invest in a broader
spectrum of investment projects while looser regulations apply to the
methods of investment. Thus, companies under this category demonstrate relatively better results than others; however, the overall returns from venture capital investing were not in any way impressive,
especially when considering the risks involved.' 2 Due to the poor performance of the Korean stock market in recent years and the fact that
the market for initial public offerings was not well developed, equity
investments by these companies were minimal-6.5% of their cumulative investments by 1995. Instead, their investments were
mostly in the form of corporate lending, which constituted 86.1% of
their investments. 43 The KTB, which is regulated by the Ministry of
Science and Technology, has the capacity to conduct the same range
of businesses as those companies registered under the Law to Assist
the Financing of New Technology Ventures."
Venture capital companies established under the Law to Promote
Small and Medium Size Companies, while comprising a majority in
40. See LEE ET AL., supra note 37, at 42 (acknowledging that by the end of
1997, there were 58 companies under this category).
41. See id. at 45 (concluding that there are only three companies in this category and they are all supported by public funds).
42. In 1993, venture capital companies in this category recorded a return on
capital of 8.8%, while venture capital companies operating under the Law to Promote Small and Medium Size Companies made a meager 2.6% return. This is in
contrast to, for instance, an 18.4% return realized by merchant banks. See LEE ET
AL., supra note 37, at 70.
43. See LEE ET AL., supra note 37, at 50.
44. See id. at 47 (finding, although not surprisingly, that 6.2% of the KTB's
investment is comprised of equity investment, whereas loans constitute 84 .6 %).
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the industry, have far less room to maneuver. 41 Venture capitalists
may only invest in small companies, as defined by the law, and such
companies must be within seven years of the start of the business. In
addition, restrictions limit investments by venture capital companies
to certain types of industries. 46 Further, venture capital companies
cannot freely make loans, but are encouraged to make equity investments. 47 Accordingly, the operational results of these companies were
less than stellar. 4' By 1995, out of twenty-five companies publicly
listed by venture capital companies in this category, only two remained.49

III. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN VENTURE
CAPITAL CONTRACTING IN KOREA
In light of the foregoing history, by enacting the SLPVCC, the Korean government granted various forms of preferential treatment and
relaxed the enforcement and regulatory rules applicable to venture
capital companies, as defined by the law. Korea's legislative history
indicates that, through the enactment of the SLPVCC, the Korean
government strove to emulate the success of the United States' venture capital system. ' " The law as enacted, however, was aimed at
emulating only the results of the United States venture capital market, without implementing the necessary contractual schemes or the
social and economic infrastructure. The nature of venture capital is
the appropriate allocation of the high risks that accompany projects
with potentials for high returns among stakeholders, combined with
heavy monitoring to reduce risks. The Korean scheme, however,

45. A majority of these companies are affiliated with banks or securities companies.
46. See Law to Promote Small and Medium Size Companies, supra note 35,
art. 3.
47. See LEE ET AL., supra note 37, at 64 (stating that equity investment comprises 46% of the total investment by 1995).
48. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
49. See LEE ET AL., supra note 37, at 42.

50. See Kim, supra note 2, at 2-3.
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grants direct and indirect subsidies to a selected group of venture
capital companies as indicated by law.
The new law in Korea ultimately may form a significantly different incentive structure than that in the United States because the law
provides a specific statutory definition for a Korean venture capital
company.5 ' Furthermore, the law provides substantial protection
against downside risks for entrepreneurs through special treatments,
such as tax breaks. Unlike the United States' venture capital system,
the SLPVCC may distort the fundamental economic incentives of the
contracting parties while limiting the downside risks faced by entrepreneurs in Korea.

A. DEFINITION OF A VENTURE CAPITAL COMPANY UNDER THE

SLPVCC
As noted in Part I, the definition of venture capital in the United
States is a functional one that cannot be defined in specific terms,
since venture capital has developed through market mechanisms over
time. There is no statutory definition of a venture capital company in
the United States. The SLPVCC, however, provides a specific and
descriptive definition. This artificial definition increases the risk of
distorting the alignment of economic incentives necessary for successful venture capital contracting.
Specifically, according to the SLPVCC, for a company to be considered as a venture capital-backed company eligible for special
treatment, it must satisfy one of the following requirements.": First, a
venture capital company must at least invest 20% of a company's
total assets. Second, a venture capital company must at least invest
10% of the total equity of a company. Third, at least 5% of the previous year's sales revenue must be spent on research and development
activities. Fourth, the main line of business of a company must be
51. See infra Part III.A (providing the descriptive and mechanic definition of a
Korean venture capital company).
52. See Kim, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that the SLPVCC does not apply to big,
conglomerate companies but only to medium and small companies). This reflects
the government's intention to let the law provide an avenue for financing for
smaller companies. See id. Venture-backed companies may, however, receive investments from conglomerates up to 30% of the equity raised. Id. at 10.
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comprised of the high technology specifically recommended by the
Industrial Property Office. In addition, in case of some special industries, such as the entertainment industry, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy possesses the discretionary power to declare a company a non-venture capital-backed company, even if it
satisfies one of the above requirements. Further, to qualify as a venture capital-backed company, the invested funds by venture capitalists must be used for knowledge-intensive or high-technology industries such as: energy substitute industry; telecommunications
industry; electronics and communications industry; information and
technology industry; and computer software industry.
A company may request that the Ministry determine whether it
qualifies as a venture capital-backed company. Upon such request,
the Ministry must render a decision and answer the request with a
written response. 3 There is considerable room for discretion, however, on the part of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy
in determining whether to designate a company as a venture capitalbacked company.
This mechanical and descriptive definition may well distort the incentive system inherent in venture capital. First, the specificity in defining a venture capital-backed company creates the danger of Korean entrepreneurs attempting to avoid the boundaries of the
definition and distort fundamental economic incentives. For example, if 19% of the company's total assets were invested by venture
capitalists, the company would have to consider the marginal benefits and marginal costs of replacing 1% of its total assets with venture
capital equity. The marginal benefits come from the special treatment
provided by the SLPVCC. On the other hand, the marginal costs
come from unnecessarily engaging in venture capital projects, which
the company may have neither the economic incentives nor the expert knowledge.
Further, special treatment may distort the fundamental capital
structure of a venture capital company. As previously discussed, a
venture capital company in the United States uses convertible preferred stocks to raise capital since the company does not generate

53. See SLPVCC, supra note 1, arts. 2-4.
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stable cash flows in its initial stage.! Special treatments, however,
may cause the company to generate positive cash flows even in its
initial stage. The cost of debt may become inexpensive, and the
company may have no incentive to use equity. Ultimately, this may
distort the fundamental economic incentive structure embedded in
the venture capital contracting system. Moreover, the company may
incur additional costs due to the change in its hedging strategy. Despite such costs, the benefits may still exceed the costs at the margin,
thereby leading to economically undesirable investments in industries that are artificially designated by the government.
Second, the government focuses on venture capital-backed companies based on high-technology industries in Korea."5 Although
American venture capital-backed companies are often associated
with high technology companies such as Microsoft and Intel, two of
the most successful venture capital endeavors, Federal Express and
Starbucks Coffee, are not technology companies." Therefore, it is not
a specific industry that creates a successful venture capital project.
Rather, it is the functional nature of the venture capital contracting
mechanism and the alignment of the economic incentives that underlie whether the venture capital contract will be successful.
Third, the law indicates that, in many instances, the Ministry of
Commerce, Industry, and Energy possesses the discretionary power
to declare whether a company qualifies as a venture capital-backed
company, entitled to special treatments. In Korea, frequent turnovers
of high-ranking government officials are a cause for concern."' In

54. See generally Gompers, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
55. See SLPVCC, supra note 1, art. 2.
56. In the case of Federal Express, the entrepreneurs developed a highly efficient and effective operational management skill to deliver mail overnight everywhere in the United States when no other company provided such service. In the
latter case, the entrepreneurs developed a unique way of catering to the upscale
coffee drinker.
57. For example, under President Kim Young Sam's regime, from 1992 to
1997, there were several occasions when the high government officials were replaced. See Shim Jae Hoon, Hero to Zero: In Just Four Years. President Kin Has
Fallen DramaticallyFrom Grace, FAR E. ECON. REv., Mar. 13, 1997, at 16 (reporting that during a four-year period, from early 1993 until early 1997, there were
six Prime Ministers, seven economic-affairs deputy-premiers, and twenty-seven
general reshuffles of cabinet members).
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such a politically volatile environment, venture capital companies, as
well as venture capitalists, cannot predict whether they will consistently receive special treatments under the SLPVCC. Further, too
much power in the hands of a few government officials may foster
"rent-seeking" activities and breed corruption. In the end, venture
capital companies and venture capitalists may have to assess noneconomic factors in measuring the possibility of success of their
venture capital projects. Such political intervention was not a factor
in the success of the United States' venture capital system.

B. PROTECTION FOR ENTREPRENEURS THROUGH SPECIAL
TREATMENTS

If an entity qualifies as a venture capital company, entrepreneurs in Korea become eligible for special treatments. These special
treatments include, to name only two, Articles 16 and 18 of the
SLPVCC. First, under Article 16 of the SLPVCC, entrepreneurs who
leave their jobs at public institutions or universities to pursue venture
capital projects are allowed to return to their original workplace
without any penalty if they return within three years. Second, under
Article 18 of the SLPVCC, entrepreneurs receive special tax breaks
on their office buildings if at least 75% of the building is occupied by
venture capital related offices. These special treatments obviously
will limit the downside risks of entrepreneurs in Korea. There is a
risk that moral hazard will become a rather serious problem and
venture capitalists will have to increase their monitoring costs.
First, under Article 16 of the SLPVCC, if professors at any public
university or employees at any public institution decide to leave their
workplaces to participate in venture capital companies, they have the
privilege of returning to their respective employment within three
years without any penalty. The Korean government claims that this
allows entrepreneurs to pursue their innovations "with confidence.""
58. See Kim, supra note 2, at 13. Apparently, the measure was undertaken to
change the perceived overcautious attitude of potential entrepreneurs and to encourage risk-taking by potential entrepreneurs. More research is warranted to cxplore the existence, if any, of the cultural or other non-economic bias discouraging
the development of entrepreneurship in Korea and to examine whether this measure is appropriate in providing incentives to potential entrepreneurs. Given the ex-
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This may skew the incentive structure, however, since risks involved
in venture capital projects should discourage incompetents from participating in the market at the outset by signaling that they have too
much to lose should the projects fail. In other words, the risky nature
of the market serves as a screening mechanism for potential entrepreneurs. If entrepreneurs in Korea are protected from losing their
jobs so long as they do not spend more than three years experimenting with their innovations, many incompetent entrepreneurs may find
it tempting to enter into the venture capital market in Korea.' In the
end, this may significantly reduce the market screening and monitoring system, resulting in venture capitalists spending more resources screening and selecting competent entrepreneurs. In addition,
assuming that this measure somehow will succeed in inducing competent potential entrepreneurs to the market, there is no basis for
limiting this privilege to three years since it takes most Korean venture capital companies more than ten years to go public."
Second, under Article 18 of the SLPVCC, if at least 75% of a
building is occupied by venture capital companies or their related offices, the building is considered a Venture Capital Building
("VCB"). A VCB must be at least three stories high and house at
least six different venture capital companies at any given time. A
VCB is free to remodel the internal section of the building without
official permission provided that it does not impose a serious threat
to the safety of the building. In addition, VCBs are entitled to real
estate tax cuts of 50%. Considering the high price and high regulation found in the real estate market in Korea, this scheme should be
considered a privilege and may have a significant impact on the geo-

istence of highly successful Korean entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley, however, cultural explanation alone would not be persuasive. Jeong Kim of Yurie Systems
might provide the case in point. See Mark Leibovich & Mike Mills, For Immigrant,A Billion-DollarHigh-Tech Deal; MarYland Entrepreneur To Sell Firm He
Founded, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 1998, at Al (recounting an American success
story of a Korean immigrant who put himself through school and founded a company that revolutionized the electronic communications industry).
59. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for *'Lemons": Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (writing for the first time
on the variant of the lemons problem).
60. See Ki Whan Lee, Promotion of Venture Capital and Economic Improvement, VENTURE CAPITAL 25 (Fall 1997) (source in Korean).
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graphic concentration of venture capital companies. 6'
The geographic concentration of venture capital companies and
the promotion of synergistic effects may be a driving force behind
this measure. In fact, in regard to the development of the United
States' venture capital industry, several commentators noted the significance of such spillovers and the existence of networks among
entrepreneurs. For instance, in her account of the development of
Silicon Valley, Annalee Saxanian attributed the success of Silicon
Valley to the flexible and informal network among the workers in the
region, as compared to the rigid and vertical structure found on
Route 128 in Massachusetts." In addition, focusing on the substance
of employment contracts prevalent in Silicon Valley, Alan Hyde
noted that the high employment turnover rate and the lack of enforcement of covenants not-to-compete helped to disseminate information among the entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley.63 Consequently,
the legal and cultural infrastructure in Silicon Valley fosters knowledge sharing, which contributes greatly to the generation of spillover
effects, thereby creating positive externalities.
The scheme of VCBs in Korea, however, may not achieve the
same cooperative and synergistic effects as in Silicon Valley unless
the attitude of Korean companies changes dramatically. For instance,
if venture capital companies were within one building, they would
spend too much time concealing their secrets from competitors, thus
impeding the operation of their scheme. Moreover, with lifetime employment still deeply rooted in the corporate culture, the employment

61. See Kim, supra note 2, at 16 (stating that a VCB is exempted from various
restrictions, which are designed to discourage the concentration of office and plant
facilities in the vicinity of metropolitan Seoul).
62. See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 29-82 (1994) (comparing the

open communications styles of the west coast with the more closed, traditional
firm management style of the east coast and the varying responses to technological
development).
63. See generally Alan Hyde, How Silicon Valley Has Eliminated Trade Se-

crets (Rutgers Law School Working Paper, 1997); Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructureof High Technology IndustrialDistrict: Silicon Valley, Route 128 and

Covenant Not to Compete (Columbia University School of Law/Sloan Foundation
Project on Corporate Governance Working Paper, 1997).
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turnover rate is expected to stay very low."' Furthermore, assuming a
high employment turnover rate, companies would see no reason not
to enforce the covenant not-to-compete. 5 In this case, VCBs would
be ineffective in creating the cooperative environment necessary for
venture capital companies to succeed. In the meantime, the special
treatments provide the opportunity for more entrepreneurs to enter
the venture capital market with less chance of penalty under the market without the SLPVCC.

IV. ASSESSMENT
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that if the underlining purpose of the SLPVCC is to emulate the success of the United States'
venture capital industry simply through the relaxation of existing
laws in Korea, the measures taken thus far are inadequate and other
complementary measures are needed. The United States' venture
capital system is based on a market mechanism. A specific form of
venture capital contracting, which allows the alignment of economic
incentives and implements a monitoring system, assists in promoting
high-risk investments in the United States. Under the SLPVCC,
however, government intervention limits the downside risks of a
project. Perhaps contrary to its original intent, the SLPVCC may
distort the market mechanism and impede the development of the
market for risky investment in Korea.
Instead of directly intervening in the venture capital market in order to promote the venture capital industry in Korea, priority must be
granted to continue efforts in developing a sound financial infrastructure, including the development of a well-functioning stock
market. 66 A well-developed financial infrastructure will provide

64. The law was amended in early 1998 in an attempt to make the labor market
more flexible, but it remains to be seen whether the market will show the promised
flexibility.
65. See Gilson, supra note 63, at 34-36 (examining California not-to-compete
covenants). In Silicon Valley, in line with the path dependency theory, Gilson argues that a chance event prohibited the enforcement of the covenant not-tocompete and it resulted in positive spillovers, contributing to the development of
the venture capital in the region. See id.
66. See Black & Gilson, supra note 3, at 244-52 (suggesting the existence of a
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venture capital investors in Korea with the potential for gain. Indeed,
the SLPVCC has two provisions that would assist in the development of the stock market. First, under Article 10 of the SLPVCC, the
face value of a stock may be as small as 100 won compared to the
existing law mandating a minimum face value of 5,000 won. The
lower face value may provide greater market liquidity. Second, Article 4 allows insurance companies to invest in venture capital on a
limited basis. The effect of this provision is akin to the United
States history surrounding ERISA's "prudent man" rule. 68 The financial deregulation, provided by Article 4, would encourage the free
flow of capital, inside and outside the stock market, which is essential to the development of the stock market.9
The overhaul of the stock market inevitably will involve the issue
of improving the market of Korea Security Dealers Association
Automated Quotation ("KOSDAQ"), the Korean counterpart of the
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
system ("NASDAQ") in the United States. 70 Despite its original intent of providing liquid capital for smaller companies, especially
venture capital companies since its opening in April of 1987,
KOSDAQ has not lived up to its expectations. First, Korean entrepreneurs do not consider KOSDAQ as an independent and separate
exchange to raise capital. Instead, they consider it as a stepping stone
to eventually listing their companies on the Korea Stock Exchange.
much stronger venture capital industry in stock market-centered systems, as in the
United States). Nonetheless, considering, for instance, the fact that some Israeli
venture-backed companies are successfully listed on the stock market in the United
States, the existence of a well-functioning domestic stock market would not necessarily be a prerequisite for the development of venture capital industry. See Asher
Blass & Yishay Yafeh, Vagabond Shoes Longing to Stray-Why Israeli Firns List
in New York-Causes and Implications (Econ. Dep't Hebrew Univ. and Bank of
Israel Research Dep't Working Paper, 1996).
67. Specific regulations are yet to be determined by the Ministry of Finance
and Economy.
68. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (discussing the change in
venture capital funding that followed the change in law).
69. The law, however, is not clear as to how and when the limits will be determined.
70. KOSDAQ is the over-the-counter market established to provide greater
capital supply to small businesses in Korea.
71. See Kun Sang Sohn, The Capital Structure Needed to Promote Venture

2000]

VENTURE CAPITAL IN KOREA47

479

Through the KOSDAQ, small companies attempt to establish their
reputation in order to be recognized by the financial intermediaries
that specialize in initial public offerings in the Korea Stock Exchange. n Second, the technology used in KOSDAQ is primitive and
the size of the market is miniscule, the amount of shares traded per
year in KOSDAQ being equal to the amount of shares traded per day
in the Korea Stock Exchange. 7' Compared to the instant match between sellers and buyers through high-speed computers utilized in
NASDAQ, KOSDAQ has a long way to go.
Korea's experience indicates that, in addition to the lack of a welldeveloped stock market, five key institutional environment traits,
which contributed to the success of the United States' venture capital
market, are missing.7 4 These five traits include the existence of large,
independent sources of venture capital funding, liquidity, highly developed incentive structures, labor mobility, and risk tolerance. First,
the lack of financial sources combined with the scarcity of independent venture capital companies has limited the placement of Korean
venture capital investments, in particular equity investments. With
the availability of funds from insurance companies, sources of venture capital funding may expand. The scarcity of well-trained venture
capitalists with appropriate screening and monitoring ability, however, may still prevent the efficient allocation of such funds.
Second, the availability of exits by an IPO is severely limited. The
lack of corporate control of the market limits the ability to exit
through acquisition by another company, thus creating a bottleneck
against the availability of liquid investment opportunities. Considering that an eventual motivation for venture investing lies in the expectation of a handsome return, potential investors may be discourCapitalCompanies, Seminar For Middle Managers of Venture Capital Companies,
97-139 (Oct. 1997) (source in Korean).
72. An overview of the working of the KOSDAQ market for smaller companies can be found at <http://venture.smba.go.kr/english/bgpolicy4.html>.
73. Although it is still hard to predict the direction of future developments, recently the KOSDAQ market grew dramatically, showing the possibility of functioning as a viable exit market for investors in start-ups. In terms of the market
capital, it grew seven times in 1999 alone. A brief description of its history and
current data can be found at its Web site at <http://www.kosdaq.or.kr>.
74. See Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 880-93 (discussing each of the five traits in
detail).
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aged from joining the market all together. Third, thus far, the role of
venture capitalists in Korea is limited to providing funds for entrepreneurs, mostly in the form of debt rather than equity. The extensive
mix of incentives and protections found in the United States are virtually non-existent in Korea. The problem is further exacerbated by
the lack of venture capitalists with strong screening and monitoring
abilities.
Fourth, under Korea's lifetime employment system and the team
approach to research and development, the market for managerial
and research talent is highly illiquid and labor mobility is relatively
limited. Finally, the failure of a venture capital project, while common in the United States,75 is not tolerated to the same degree in Korea. Instead of creating schemes to encourage risk-taking in new
ventures, various private and government schemes are in place that
reduce risks, providing defacto insurance against failure. Ultimately,
a skewed incentive system will foster problems resulting from adverse selection and moral hazard.

CONCLUSION
The relationship between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists is a
complex one and the working of the monitoring and incentive system
is multifaceted. An attempt to emulate the result of the market evolution in another country can not create the desired result if the necessary establishment of institutional infrastructure does not accompany the endeavor. Incentive structure, labor practices, and other
institutional frameworks all need to change to promote the market for
innovation in Korea. As long as the Korean government provides a
sound financial infrastructure for risk-loving investors and does not
interfere directly with the fundamental market mechanism imbedded
in venture capital, the venture capital industry in Korea, with its
highly educated and highly innovative population, is bound to evolve
on its own.

75. See Sahlman, supra note 17, at 475 (explaining the degree of failure of
American venture capital projects in light of capitalist market schemes and the
level of United States regulatory mechanisms).

